The State of Utah v. William Keith Reigenborn : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
The State of Utah v. William Keith Reigenborn :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Byron Burmester; Deputy District Attorney; Attorney for Appellee.
Shannon N. Romero; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Reigenborn, No. 20000113 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2623
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
WILLIAM KEITH REIGENBORN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20000113-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Assault, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 1998), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, Murray Department, State of Utah, the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, Judge, 
presiding. 
SHANNON N. ROMERO (7974) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
BYRON "FRED" BURMESTER 
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
2001 South State, S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Attorney for Appellee 
'-[LED 
M P') Court o? AopMfe 
JUP 0 5 ?PflO 
Joh& D'AlMandro 
n^erk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
WILLIAM KEITH REIGENBORN, : Case No. 20000113-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Assault, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (Supp. 1998), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, Murray Department, State of Utah, the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, Judge, 
presiding. 
SHANNON N. ROMERO (7974) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
BYRON "FRED" BURMESTER 
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
2001 South State, S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Attorney for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1-2 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3-9 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 9 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE 
DEFENSE'S MOTION TO CONTINUE 10-13 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. REIGENBORN'S RIGHT 
TO REPRESENTATION BY AN ATTORNEY OF HIS CHOOSING 13-14 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL DENIED 
MR. REIGENBORN HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL 14-17 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW 17-19 
POINT V. MR. REIGENBORN WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
COMPULSORY PROCESS 19-20 
CONCLUSION 20 
Addendum A: Criminal Judgment and Sentence 
Addendum B: Text of relevant constitutional and statutory provisions 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES CITED 
Argersineer v.Hamlin. 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed 2d 530 (1972) 2-3,13 
Fernandez v. Cook. 870 P.2d 870 (Utah 1993) 2,14 
Lavton City v. Longcrier. 943 P.2d 655 (Utah App. 1997) 1,10,11 
State v. Barker. 35 Wash. App. 388 667 P.2d 108 (1983) 1,10 
State v. Cabututan. 861 P.2d 408,414 (Utah 1993) 2,15 
State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982) 10 
State v. Grotepas. 906 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1995) 2,14 
State v. Humphervs. 707 P.2d 109 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) 10 
State v. Moosman. 542 P.2d 1093 (Utah 1975) 10 
State v. Oliver. 820 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991) 1,10 
State v. Pursifell. 746 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1987) 15,16 
State v. Scales. 946 P.2d 377 (Utah App. 1997) 2,17 
State v. Schreuder. 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) 2,19 
State v. Wulffenstein. 733 P.2d 120 (Utah 1986) 13 
United States v. Burton. 584 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 10 
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal. 458 U.S. 858,102 S. Ct. 3440,73 L.Ed 2d 1193 (1982) 
2,19 
United States v. Weltv. 674 F.2d 185 (2d. Cir. 1967) 15 
Webster v. Jones. 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978) 2,13 
Page 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1999) 2, 3 
Uti ihl mlc Ann *) 7<»-'M()S H<W»M 12 
Amend. VI, U.S. Constitutio 1. -* • v 
Amend. XIV, U.S. Constitution 1 
Art. 1, sec. 12, Utah Constitutio. 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-604(l) 2, 17 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
WILLIAM KEITH REIGENBORN, : Case No. 20000113-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the district court abused its discretion and violated Mr. Reigenborn's right to 
due process by denying the defense's motion to continue the trial? 
Standard of Review: The grant or denial of a motion to continue is within the trial court's 
discretion. State v. Oliver. 820 P.2d 474,476 (Utah App. 1991). Absent a clear abuse of 
discretion, this Court will not reverse the trial court's decision. Id In order to demonstrate a 
clear abuse of discretion, the moving party must demonstrate that it was "materially prejudiced 
by the court's denial of the continuance or that the trial result would have been different had the 
continuance been granted." IdL, citing State v. Barker, 35 Wash.App. 388, 667 P.2d 108, 114 
(1983). See also Lavton City v. Longcrier. 943 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah App. 1997). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Reigenborn his constitutional right to 
counsel of his choosing? 
Standard of Review: An accused in a criminal proceeding enjoys a federal and state 
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel when charged with an offense which may be 
punished by imprisonment. See U.S. Const., Amend VI; Utah Const, art. 1, Sec. 12; Argersinger 
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528, 
530 (Utah 1978). If an accused is able or employ counsel, he or she has the right to 
representation by an attorney of his or her choice; if an accused is indigent, he or she is entitled 
to court-appointed counsel. Webster, 587 P»2d at 530; State v. Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d 120,121 
(Utah 1986). 
3. Whether Mr. Reigenborn was denied his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel by the trial 
court's denial of his motion to continue? 
Standard of Review: The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the assistance of 
counsel for his defense." Salt Lake City v. Grotepas, 906 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1995) (quoting 
U.S. Const, amend. VI). The guarantee to assistance of counsel has been held to mean the right 
to effective assistance of counsel. Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 874 (Utah 1993 V "Denying 
a continuance may result in the violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.1' 
State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408,414 (Utah 1993). 
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying defense counsel's motion to 
withdraw? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's decision to grant or deny counsel's motion to 
withdraw in a criminal case is discretionary and will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377 (Utah App. 1997); Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-604(l). 
5. Whether Mr. Reigenborn was denied his constitutional right to compulsory process? 
Standard of Review: In order to demonstrate a violation of the constitutional right to 
compulsory process, a defendant must make some plausible showing the testimony of the absent 
witness "would have been both material and favorable to his defense." State v. Schreuder, 712 
P.2d 264,274 (Utah 1985) (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bemal, 458 U.S. 858, 873,102 
S. Ct. 3440, 3449, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982) (footnote omitted)). Testimony is deemed material 
and its exclusion prejudicial "if there is a reasonable probability that its presence would affect the 
outcome of the trial." Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, amendment VI 
United States Constitution, amendment XIV 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102 
2 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
William Reigenborn was charged with assault based on an incident in September 1998 
wherein Mr. Reigenborn was alleged to have assaulted and caused substantial bodily injury to 
Kenneth Pace. At the arraignment, the Honorable Joseph Fratto appointed the Salt lake Legal 
Defender Association to represent Mr. Reigenborn. At the pretrial conference, Mr. Reigenborn 
was represented by Nisa Sisneros, an attorney with the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, at 
which time a jury trial date was set. The original trial date was continued by the court due to a 
higher priority case going forward on the same date. At the next hearing, Mr. Reigenborn 
appeared with defense counsel and informed the court of his desire to hire private counsel. The 
next date for trial was continued at the request of the prosecutor. Finally, a jury trial was set for 
July 27,1999. Mr. Reigenborn appeared on the jury trial date and both he and Ms. Sisneros 
requested a continuance due to lack of contact and Mr. Reigenborn's desire to hire private 
counsel. The court denied the motion and the case proceeded to jury trial wherein Mr. 
Reigenborn was convicted of assault, as charged. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 7,1999, an information was filed in the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
Department, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, charging William Keith Reigenborn 
with one count of assault, a class A misdemeanor, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102. (R. 
1-2.) The charge stemmed from a single incident on September 2,1998, wherein Mr. 
Reigenborn was alleged to have pushed and hit Kenneth Pace a number of times. (R. 2.) On 
January 26,1999, Mr. Reigenborn appeared before the Honorable Joseph Fratto for an 
arraignment. (R. 11-13.) On the basis of Mr. Reigenborn's indigence and considering the 
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seriousness of the charge, the court appointed the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association to 
represent Mr. Reigenbom. (R. 12.) The court then set the matter for a pretrial conference on 
February 23, 1999, at 9:00 a.m. (R. 11.) 
On February 9,1999, Nisa Sisneros, an attorney with the Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association, filed her notice of appearance and request for discovery. (R. 16-19.) On February 
23,1999, Mr. Reigenbom appeared at the pretrial conference with Ms. Sisneros and requested a 
jury trial, which the court set for March 25,1999. (R. 20.) When Ms. Sisneros and Mr. 
Reigenbom appeared for trial on March 25, they were informed by the court that a higher priority 
case was going forward that day and Mr. Reigenbom's trial date would be reset. (R. 20.) At that 
time, Mr. Reigenbom informed the court of his desire to hire private counsel. The matter was 
reset for jury trial on May 20,1999. (R. 20.) 
On May 20,1999, Mr. Reigenbom appeared before Judge Fratto and informed the court 
of his desire to hire private counsel. (Pretrial Conference Tr. "PTC Tr." 2.)1 Ms. Sisneros moved 
to withdraw as counsel, but her motion was denied. (PTC Tr. 3.) The court ordered Ms. 
Sisneros to continue to represent Mr. Reigenbom but informed her that she could withdraw from 
representation as soon as Mr. Reigenbom retained private counsel. (PTC Tr. 3.) The jury trial 
was then reset for July 13,1999. (PTC Tr. 3; R. 24.) On June 8,1999, the state moved to 
continue the trial due to the unavailability of witnesses and the court granted that motion, 
resetting the trial for July 27,1999. (R. 25-30.) On July 8,1999, Ms. Sisneros sent a notice to 
1
 The original transcripts, which are part of the record on appeal, were not given a record 
cite by the district court. Defense counsel contacted Paulette Stagg at the clerk's office and was 
informed that reference to the different transcripts should be made clear but that the appeal could 
proceed despite this lack of pagination. 
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Mr. Reigenborn at his 2196 East Lamboume Avenue address in Salt Lake City, informing him 
that the date for jury trial was July 27,1999, and requesting that he contact her. 
On July 27,1999, Mr. Reigenbom appeared before the Honorable Judge Fratto and 
moved to continue the trial so that he could retain private counsel. (Jury Trial Tr. "J.T. Tr." 4.) 
Mr. Reigenbom explained that he was a long-haul truck driver and had spoken with an attorney 
but had been unable to meet with that attorney in person. (J.T. Tr. 4.) The court denied the 
motion. (J.T. Tr. 4-5.) Mr. Reigenbom then stated "She won't subpoena anybody for me." (J.T. 
Tr. 5:2-3.) "She says she can't get ahold of somebody on the phone. That-she's got their 
address, subpoena them; I can't do nothing without no witnesses." (J.T. Tr. 5:6-9.) "I've told 
her several times to subpoena people for me- -" (J.T. Tr. 5:13-14.) Defense counsel then 
renewed her motion to continue and her motion to withdraw, pointing out that Mr. Reigenbom 
had not contacted her regarding his case and she did not believe she could effectively represent 
him. (J.T. Tr. 6:8-25.) Ms. Sisneros also noted that she believed Mr. Reigenbom may qualify 
for a number of defenses but that she had insufficient contact with Mr. Reigenbom to pursue 
such defenses. (J.T. Tr. 6:19-23.) The court denied both motions, noting that if defense counsel 
was less than prepared it was the result of Mr. Reigenbom not having contact with her and that it 
was his burden to shoulder; the matter proceeded to jury trial. (J.T. Tr. 7:1-5.) 
Thereafter a six-person jury was chosen from a pool of 16 potential jurors. (R. 62-63; 
J.T. Tr. 9-40.) The jury then heard opening statements from counsel, followed by the 
presentation of testimony from Sharon Snipes, Kenneth Pace, and Edward Lynch. (J.T. Tr. 57-
134.) Ms. Snipes is Mr. Reigenbom's ex-wife, Mr. Pace is the victim in this matter, and Officer 
Lynch is the officer who investigated the matter on behalf of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs 
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Office. 
Ms. Snipes testified that on September 2,1998, Mr. Reigenborn resided in the basement 
apartment at 2196 East Lambourne Avenue in Salt Lake City while Ms. Snipes' mother lived 
upstairs. (J.T. Tr. 67:15-16; 68:7-9.) That morning, Ms. Snipes testified that she telephoned Mr. 
Reigenborn's apartment but no one answered. (J.T. Tr 68-69.) Ms. Snipes testified that she then 
called her mother and was told that Mr. Reigenborn had already left for work. (J.T. Tr. 69:1-3.) 
Based upon her understanding that Mr. Reigenborn would not be at the 2196 East Lambourne 
Avenue address, Ms. Snipes proceeded to that address with Kenneth Pace and her son, Nathan, 
so that Nathan could retrieve some school clothes. (J.T. Tr. 69.) 
Upon arriving at the 2196 East Lambourne address, Nathan went down the steps to Mr. 
Reigenborn's apartment. (J.T. Tr. 69:18-19.) When Nathan walked back up the stairs, Mr. 
Reigenborn was right behind him. (J.T. Tr. 69:19-20.) At that time. Mr. Reigenborn told Ms. 
Snipes that he was on the phone with suicide hotline (J.T. Tr. 69:22-25.) Mr. Reigenborn then 
made a statement to the effect that if he went to jail, he would not have to die. (J.T. Tr. 69-70.) 
Immediately thereafter, Mr. Pace attempted to get in the driver's seat of Ms. Snipes' vehicle 
when "[Mr. Reigenborn] grabbed ahold of him and threw him into the bushes." (J.T. Tr 70:11-
13.) At this point, Ms. Snipes went downstairs and called 9-1-1. (J.T. Tr. 70:14-15.) Ms. Snipes 
testified that in total, she observed Mr. Reigenborn hit Mr. Pace five or six times in the face with 
his fist. (J.T. Tr. 73:2-4.) Ms. Snipes was able to get Mr. Pace in the vehicle and transport him 
to St. Mark's Hospital. (J.T. 73:13-14.) Following the incident, Ms. Snipes observed that the 
left side of Mr. Pace's jaw was swollen and puffy, his nose was displaced and both of his eyes 
were black. (J.T. Tr. 74:14-19; plaintiffs exhibit 8.) 
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On cross-examination Ms. Snipes admitted that she was aware Mr. Reigenbom had some 
emotional problems generally and specifically with regard to dealing with her. (J.T. Tr. 78-79.) 
She also clarified that Mr. Reigenbom was on the cordless phone with suicide prevention as he 
approached her. (J.T. Tr. 79:14-22.) Finally, Ms. Snipes testified that Mr. Reigenbom was upset, 
angry, and yelling, and described his appearance as f,[d]emonic,f and noted that the veins on his 
face were bulging. (J.T. Tr.81.) 
The jury then heard testimony from Mr. Pace. Mr. Pace testified that at about 7:30 or 
8:00 a.m. on September 2,1998, he, Ms. Snipes and Nathan, went to Mr. Reigenbom's 
apartment, located at 2196 East Lamboume Avenue, to pick up some school clothes for Nathan. 
(J.T. Tr. 86:22-25.) When they pulled into the driveway, Mr. Pace was assisting Ms. Snipes and 
Nathan out of the car when Mr. Reigenbom exited his apartment through the back door of the 
home. (J.T. Tr. 89: 9-11.) Mr. Pace testified that he heard Mr. Reigenbom tell Ms. Snipes that 
he was on the phone with suicide hotline and then overhead him engage in a verbal confrontation 
with Ms. Snipes. (J.T. Tr. 89:18-25.) Immediately thereafter, Mr. Reigenbom came toward Mr. 
Pace and said: "'But if I go to jail, I won't have to commit suicide.'" (J.T. Tr. 90:3-4.) Mr. 
Reigenbom then proceeded to chase Mr. Pace and hit him with his fists. (J.T. Tr. 90:4-6.) Mr. 
Pace testified that Mr. Reigenbom "had that rage look in his eyes" (J.T. Tr. 90:11-12) when he 
attacked Mr. Pace and that Mr. Reigenbom hit him about 30 to 40 times, mostly in the face. (J.T. 
Tr. 93:13-14.) Mr. Pace was finally able to get back into the vehicle at which time Ms. Snipes 
transported him to the hospital. Mr. Pace suffered a broken nose, a cracked jaw and some 
chipped teeth as aresult of the altercation. (J.T. Tr. 91:12-13; 95:20-21.) 
On cross-examination, Mr. Pace acknowledged that he aware Mr. Reigenbom harbored 
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some anger over the fact that Mr. Pace was with Ms. Snipes. (J.T. Tr. 101:4-6.) Mr. Pace also 
admitted that he aware of the uneasy relationship between Ms. Snipes and Mr. Reigenborn. (J.T. 
Tr. 102:12-13.) Mr. Pace testified that Mr. Reigenborn came toward him with "anger", "rage" 
and "meanness" in his eyes such that Mr. Pace testified he had "never seen anything like that in 
my life before, to be honest with you." (J.T. Tr. 106:19-21.) 
Finally, the state called Deputy Sheriff Edward Lynch of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs 
Office to testify. Deputy Lynch testified that he first met Ms. Snipes and Mr. Pace at the St 
Mark's Hospital Emergency Room. (J.T. Tr. 110:1-3.) Deputy Lynch testified that he observed 
Mr. Pace's nose to be swollen, "not shaped like a nose would be shaped" and noticed that Mr. 
Pace had scratches and abrasions on his hands, and that his jaw seemed to be "a little swollen." 
(J.T. Tr. 110-11.) Deputy Lynch also testified that he was unable to make contact with Mr. 
Reigenborn with regard to the incident. (J.T. Tr. I l l :8-17.) At this point, the state rested. (J.T. 
Tr. 114:16-17.) 
Outside the presence of the jury, Ms. Sisneros moved for a directed verdict on the bases 
that the government failed to meet its burden, particularly with regard to proving that Mr. 
Reigenborn committed the offense with the requisite intent. (J.T. Tr. 115-16.) Ms. Wissler, the 
deputy district attorney, opposed the motion, arguing that the issue of intent was an issue strictly 
for the jury and that based on the evidence presented, the jury could easily find Mr. Reigenborn 
possessed the requisite intent to commit the crime of assault. (J.T. Tr. 116-17.) The court denied 
the motion for a directed verdict, concluding that the state had presented at least a prima facie 
case with regard to each element necessary to prove Mr. Reigenborn committed the crime of 
assault. (J.T.Tr. 118:3-6.) 
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Following a short recess, the defense rested without calling any witnesses. (J.T. Tr. 
119:21-22.) The court read jury instructions and then counsel made closing argument. 
Thereafter, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict finding Mr. Reigenbom guilty of assault 
with substantial bodily injury. (J.T. Tr. 147.) 
The court ordered a presentence report to be completed prior to sentencing. (J.T. Tr. 
150:11-13.) On January 10, 2000, Mr. Reigenbom appeared before the court for sentencing. 
The court imposed a one-year jail sentence, suspended, and ordered 18 months of court-
supervised probation. (Sentencing Transcript "S. Tr." 7:14-20.) The court also imposed a 
$1,500 fine, suspending $750. (S. Tr. 7:16-18.) The following conditions of probation were 
ordered by the court: (1) that Mr. Reigenbom violate no laws; (2) that Mr. Reigenbom pay the 
$750 fine in its entirety; (3) that Mr. Reigenbom perform 100 hours of community at a rate of 15 
hours per month, with monthly proof submitted to the court on February 15,2000, and the 15th of 
each month thereafter; (4) that Mr. Reigenbom maintain full-time employment or attend classes 
full-time or do each part-time; (5) that Mr. Reigenbom complete any treatment recommended by 
the Veteran's Administration; and (6) that Mr. Reigenbom attend group therapy through the 
Veteran's Administration two times per week. (S. Tr. 7-8.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Reigenbom was denied his constitutional rights to due process and his sixth 
amendment right to counsel when the district court would not grant him a continuance to retain 
private counsel. The denial of the continuance also denied Mr. Reigenbom his constitutional 
right to compulsory process and his constitutional right to counsel of his choosing. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED IT'S DISCRETION IN DENYING THE 
DEFENSE'S MOTION TO CONTINUE 
The trial court abused its discretion in denying the defense's motion to continue and 
requiring defense counsel to proceed to jury trial given the lack of contact between defense 
counsel and Mr. Reigenborn and Mr. Reigenborn's desire to retain private counsel. The grant or 
denial of a motion to continue is within the trial court's discretion. State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 
476 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Humphervs. 707 P.2d 109,109 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); 
State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982); State v. Moosman, 542 P.2d 1093,1094 
(Utah 1975)). Absent a clear abuse of discretion, this Court will not reverse the trial court's 
decision. Id In order to demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion, the moving party must 
demonstrate that it was "materially prejudiced by the court's denial of the continuance or that the 
trial result would have been different had the continuance been granted." IdL (citing State v. 
Barken 35 Wash.App. 388, 667 P.2d 108,114 (1983)). See also Lavton City v. Longcrier, 943 
P.2d 655, 659 (Utah App. 1997). The factors to be considered in determining whether the trial 
court's denial of a defendant's request for a continuance to obtain counsel constitutes an abuse of 
discretion include: 
[1] whether other continuances have been requested and granted; [2] the balanced 
convenience or inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court; 
[3] whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons or whether it is dilatory, 
purposeful, or contrived; [4] whether the defendant contributed to the 
circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance;... [and 5] 
whether denying the continuance will result in identifiable prejudice to 
defendant's case, and if so, whether this prejudice is of a material or substantial 
nature. 
United States v. Burton. 584 F.2d 485, 490-91 (D.C.Cir. 1978) (quoted with approval in Lavton 
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City v. Longcrier. 946 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah App. 1997)). 
It appears from the record that the only prior continuance in this matter was requested by 
the state. (R. 25-30.) It does not appear that the defense requested a continuance other than the 
one requested on July 27,1999, which the court denied. Moreover, there is nothing in the record 
to indicate that the trial court attempted to balance the inconvenience of witnesses, counsel, and 
the court against the rights of Mr. Reigenborn. Mr. Reigenborn had a legitimate reason for 
failing to secure private counsel; he is a long-haul truck-driver and was not in town long enough 
to set a meeting with private counsel. (J.T. Tr. 4.) While Mr. Reigenborn bears some 
responsibility for failing to secure private counsel, certainly he should have been given the same 
opportunity as the state was given in this matter: one continuance. 
When the trial court denied the motion to continue, Mr. Reigenborn stated: "She [defense 
counsel] won't subpoena anybody for me." (J.T. Tr. 5:2-3.) "She says she can't get ahold [sic] 
of somebody on the phone. That- she's got their address, subpoena them; I can't do nothing 
without no witnesses." (J.T. Tr. 5:6-9.) "I've told her several times to subpoena people for me- -" 
(J.T. Tr. 5:13-14.) Defense counsel then renewed her motion to continue, pointing out that Mr. 
Reigenborn had not contacted her regarding his case and she did not believe she could effectively 
represent him. Defense counsel also noted that she believed Mr. Reigenborn may qualify for a 
number of defenses but that she had insufficient contact with Mr. Reigenborn to pursue such 
defenses. (J.T. Tr. 6.) The court denied both motions, noting that if defense counsel was less 
than prepared it was the result of Mr. Reigenborn not having contact with her; the matter 
proceeded to jury trial wherein Mr. Reigenborn was convicted of class A misdemeanor assault. 
(J.T. Tr. 7:1-5.) 
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The record reflects that the trial court was informed by Mr. Reigenborn that there were 
witnesses he wanted to call in his defense who were not present on the trial date but who could 
provide favorable testimony. (J.T. Tr. 5.) Moreover, defense counsel informed the court of her 
belief that Mr. Reigenborn may qualify for a number of defenses which she could not pursue 
effectively given Mr. Reigenborn's lack of contact with her prior to trial. (J.T. Tr. 5.) 
One witness Mr. Reigenborn sought to call was Ms. Snipes' mother. Ms. Snipes' mother 
lived at 2196 East Lambourne above the apartment where Mr. Reigenborn resided. Ms. Snipes' 
mother could have either confirmed or contradicted Ms. Snipes' testimony that a call had been 
placed to Mr. Reigenborn's apartment and to Ms. Snipes' mother with regard to Mr. 
Reigenborn's presence at or absence from the residence. Moreover, the testimony presented at 
trial indicates that at the time of the incident, Mr. Reigenborn suffered from a mental illness to 
the extent that a diminished capacity defense may have been appropriate to negate the mens rea 
necessary to convict Mr. Reigenborn of the intentional crime of assault. Surely Ms. Snipes' 
mother could have provided some testimony and insight as to Mr. Reigenborn's state of mind 
and mental health during the time leading up to this instance. However, defense counsel was 
unable to call Ms. Snipes or pursue this defense due to the trial court's denial of a continuance.2 
The trial court did not attempt to reconcile the interests of the state in proceeding to trial 
and those of Mr. Reigenborn in receiving a continuance either to retain private counsel or meet 
with court-appointed counsel. Certainly the trial court could have accommodated both interests 
2
 Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (l)(a) (1999), "[i]t is a defense to a prosecution 
under any statute or ordinance that the defendant, as a result of mental illness, lacked the mental 
state required as an element of the offense charged." This includes the defenses of insanity and 
diminished mental capacity. Utah Code. Ann. § 76-2-305(2). 
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by offering Reigenborn the option of continuing the trial but requiring Mr. Reigenborn to pay 
witness and/or juror fees, thereby imposing some penalty on Mr. Reigenborn for the delay while 
also providing a disincentive for additional delay by Mr. Reigenborn in procuring private 
counsel. Under these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defense's 
motion to continue. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. REIGENBORN'S RIGHT TO 
REPRESENTATION BY AN ATTORNEY OF HIS CHOOSING 
The trial court committed error in denying Mr. Reigenborn the opportunity to exercise his 
right to employ an attorney of his choice. An accused in a criminal proceeding enjoys a federal 
and state constitutional right to the assistance of counsel when charged with an offense which 
may be punished by imprisonment. See U.S. Const, amend VI; Utah Const, art. 1, Sec. 12; 
Argersineer v.Hamlin. 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); Webster v. Jones. 
587 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah 1978). If an accused is able to employ counsel, he or she has the right 
to representation by an attorney of his or her choice; if an accused is indigent, he or she is 
entitled to court-appointed counsel. Webster, 587 P.2d at 530; State v. Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d 
120, 121 (Utah 1986). 
Here, Mr. Reigenborn expressed his desire and intent to hire private counsel. Mr. 
Reigenborn informed the court on the day of jury trial that he had made contact with a specific 
attorney and was in the process of setting up a meeting with that attorney. (J.T. Tr. 5.) Despite 
this explicit expression of the desire to retain private counsel and Mr. Reigenborn's expression of 
dissatisfaction with court-appointed counsel, the trial court required Mr. Reigenborn to proceed 
to trial that day with court-appointed counsel. While it is true that Mr. Reigenborn had 
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previously expressed his intention to hire private counsel and had failed to do so by the date of 
trial, Mr. Reigenborn did inform the trial court that his job as a long-haul trucker kept him away 
from home and made it difficult for him to retain private counsel in a timely manner. This is not 
a case of willful delay but one of excusable neglect. There is nothing in the record to support a 
conclusion that the state would be prejudiced by the trial court's grant of a continuance, i.e., that 
witnesses would fail to appear if a new date were to be set by the court. 
Under these circumstances, certainly Mr. Reigenborn's right to choice of counsel 
outweighs any interest the state had in moving forward on the date set for trial. Mr. Reigenborn 
was prejudiced because he was forced to proceed to trial represented by counsel with whom he 
had had limited contact with and with whom he did not believe was properly looking out for his 
interests. Thus, the trial court should have granted a continuance to permit Mr. Reigenborn to 
hire private counsel. 
m. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL DENIED MR. 
REIGENBORN HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
In denying Mr. Reigenborn's request for a continuance, the trial court denied Mr. 
Reigenborn his constitutional right to counsel by forcing the matter to trial despite defense 
counsel's lack of preparedness. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that ff[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. Const, amend VI (quoted in Salt Lake City v. 
Grotepas. 906 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1995)). The guarantee of assistance of counsel has been held 
to mean the right to effective assistance of counsel. Fernandez v. Cook. 870 P.2d 870, 874 (Utah 
1993). "A serious lack of preparation might, in some circumstances, have such a 
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disadvantageous effect on a defendant's representation as to rise to a constitutional violation." 
State v. Pursifell 746 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah App. 1987). When lack of preparation by defense 
counsel is at issue, ff[d]enying a continuance may result in the violation of a defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel." State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408,414 (Utah 1993). 
In Pursifell 746 P.2d at 272, the a defendant requested substitute counsel on the day of 
trial based on his feeling that appointed counsel had not done everything she could have in his 
case. The trial court inquired into the defendant's complaint and, after concluding that defense 
counsel had done a good job in representing the defendant's interests, denied defendant's motion 
for substitute counsel The matter proceed to jury trial and the defendant was convicted of 
burglary, attempted burglary, two counts of theft, and two counts of vehicle burglary. 
In evaluating the defendant's claim on appeal, the Court noted that 
when a complaint is registered by a criminal defendant concerning his or her 
appointed counsel, the court must balance the potential for last minute delay and 
the propensity for manipulation of the system against the competing concern 
about the likely inability of indigent defendants to articulate and communicate 
their dissatisfaction in a setting which most laypersons find quite intimidating. 
Pursifell 746 P.2d at 273. When such dissatisfaction is expressed, the trial court must employ 
reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine the nature of the defendant's 
complaints and to apprise [sic] itself of the facts necessary to determine whether 
the defendant's relationship with his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to 
the point that sound discretion requires substitution or even to such an extent that 
his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel would be violated but for 
substitution. Even when the trial judge suspects that the defendant's requests are 
disingenuous and designed solely to manipulate the judicial process and delay the 
trial, perfunctory questioning is not sufficient. 
Id (citing United States v. Weltv. 674 F.2d 185,187 (2d Cir. 1967)). 
Applying this analysis, the Pursifell Court concluded that the trial court had properly 
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inquired into the defendant's concerns by asking the defendant to identify the specific way in 
which counsel had not represented his interests. The defendant indicated that he had met with 
counsel on only one occasion and that he had not been timely informed of a court hearing on 
defense counsel's motion for discovery. Id at 273. On the basis of the defendant's complaints, 
the court asked both the prosecutor and defense counsel about the discovery motion. The 
appellate court noted that this inquiry was sufficient and although the trial court should have 
inquired further into the defendant's complaints with respect counsel's pretrial preparation, 
failure to do so was not reversible error. Id. at 273-74. Notably, the Court concluded that "a 
single, face-to-face meeting before trial is not, in itself, indicative of a lack of preparation in 
cases like the instant one." IcL at 274. (Footnote omitted.) 
Similarly, in the instant matter, Mr. Reigenborn requested a continuance to retain private 
counsel to substitute for court-appointed counsel. Mr. Reigenborn expressed his desire to retain 
private counsel and clearly expressed his concerns regarding court-appointed counsel to the trial 
court. With respect to this concern, the following colloquy took place between the trial court and 
Mr. Reigenborn: 
MR. REIGENBORN: She won't subpoena anybody for me. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm - - I'm - - let me - -1 - -
MR. REIGENBORN: She says she can't get ahold [sic] of somebody on 
the phone. That - - she's got their address, subpoena them; I can't do nothing 
without no witnesses. 
THE COURT: Well, [defense counsel] has been appointed to represent 
you. She's the professional and I expect her and I'm sure she will proceed - -
MR. REIGENBORN: I've told her several times to subpoena people for 
me - -
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THE COURT: When I'm speaking, I need you to be quiet, while I'm 
speaking. Let me tell you what the rules of the - - of the situation are going to be. 
We're going to have a trial today. [Defense counsel] is going to represent 
you. We're going to empanel a jury and we're going to hear the witnesses. If--
if, at any point, you act up, then I'll remove you from the courtroom, we'll 
proceed in the trial without your presence. 
(J.T. Tr. 5-6.) 
The trial court here did not engage Mr. Reigenborn in the type of questioning designed to 
get to the heart of his complaints with respect to counsel. Mr. Reigenborn clearly expressed his 
concerns, which the court cursorily dismissed. Moreover, defense counsel informed the court 
that she had had no contact with Mr. Reigenborn, aside from seeing him in court on scheduled 
court dates. There was no face-to-face meeting as there was in Pursifell and the potential 
diminished mental capacity defense makes this case much more complicated than a routine 
assault case would be, even for experienced trial counsel. Under these circumstances, Mr. 
Reigenborn was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his conviction should be 
reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENSE 
COUNSEL'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
In light of Mr. Reigenborn's dissatisfaction and lack of contact with appointed counsel, 
the trial court abused its discretion in denying defense counsel's motion to withdraw. A trial 
court's decision to grant or deny counsel's motion to withdraw is discretionary and will be 
reversed only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Scales. 946 P.2d 377 (Utah App. 1997); Utah 
Code Jud. Admin. R4-604(1)(B) ("A motion to withdraw as an attorney in a criminal case shall 
be made in open court with the defendant present unless otherwise ordered by the court."). 
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As previously noted, defense counsel had had no pretrial contact with Mr. Reigenborn, 
aside from speaking with him at court hearings. Defense counsel informed the trial court of Mr. 
Reigenborn's desire to retain private counsel and the court heard directly from Mr. Reigenborn 
with regard to his complaints about defense counsel. Mr. Reigenborn expressed the following 
concerns to the court: 
MR. REIGENBORN: She won't subpoena anybody for me. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm - - I'm - - let me - -1 - -
MR. REIGENBORN: She says she can't get ahold [sic] of somebody on 
the phone. That - - she's got their address, subpoena them; I can't do nothing 
without no witnesses. 
THE COURT: Well, [defense counsel] has been appointed to represent 
you. She's the professional and I expect her and I'm sure she will proceed - -
MR. REIGENBORN: I've told her several times to subpoena people for 
me --
THE COURT: When I'm speaking, I need you to be quiet, while I'm 
speaking. Let me tell you what the rules of the - - of the situation are going to be. 
We're going to have a trial today. [Defense counsel] is going to represent 
you. We're going to empanel a jury and we're going to hear the witnesses. If--
if, at any point, you act up, then I'll remove you from the courtroom, we'll 
proceed in the trial without your presence. 
(J.T. Tr. 5-6.) It is clear from this exchange that Mr. Reigenborn harbored serious concerns 
about court-appointed counsel. The court did not inquire into these concerns but merely told Mr. 
Reigenborn that the case would be proceeding to trial. Clearly, from Mr. Reigenborn's 
perspective, the attorney-client relationship had deteriorated to the point where Mr. Reigenborn 
did not believe counsel could or would adequately represent his interests. Under these 
circumstances, absent the court granting the motion to continue, the court should have granted 
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defense counsel's motion to withdraw and the failure to do so constituted an abuse of discretion. 
MR. REIGENBORN WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITIITM )NAl, RIGHT TO 
COMPULSORY PROCESS 
The trial court's refusal to grant a continuance resulted in a denial of Mr. Reigenborn's 
constitutional right to compulsory process as secured by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and article I, section I l il iln I Ihh \ i nslilul i MS I unsl iiiinul \ I m""! 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * have compulsory process for 
obtaining w itnesses in his fa\ 01 tah Const, art. .ec • • juaranteeing to a criminal 
defendant the right "to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of w itnesses in his 
own behalf."). In order to demonstrate a violation of the constitutional right to compulsory 
piixvss, .I defniiilLiii'il mii',1 HUIIM soiinn pl.iusilik' shossiny IIMI I lie testimony of the absent witness 
"would have been both material and favorable to his defense." State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 
2 ; I (I Jtah 1985) (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-BernaL 458 U.S. 858, 873,102 S. Ct. 
3440, 3449, 73 I I I'M I lOX^HIonlnoIr omilfnln I rMtiimtny IS ilmnni material and its 
exclusion prejudicial "if there is a reasonable probability that its presence would affect the 
'"'jiuHU'L ol the dial lil 
Here, Mr. Reigenborn would have called Ms, Sninr ! , 
Snipes' mother lived at the same address as Mr. Reigenborn at the time of the assault. At trial, 
M., \, ||v«. itH.i.in.j ,,. (.jid, 'in .IL. I ^j,,. I,!..., in M | IM ,;.(to my mom, she said that Bill had 
gone to work. I said, okay, I'm bringing Nathan over to get some clothes. So, Ken drove me 
over for - - to get Nathan some clothes for school." (I T Tr. 69; 1 -5.) On cross-examination, 
M.s. Snipes coin nk i ! liLm hi ^n hil il m i il il i HI mn II i^ lil lu retneve tromthe 
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Lambourne residence, but "because my mother said Bill had gone to work, I came over." (J.T. 
Tr. 82:2-9.) Ms. Snipes further testified that she was trying to stay away from Mr. Reigenborn. 
(J.T. Tr. 83:12-14.) Ms. Snipes' mother would have either confirmed or controverted Ms. Snipes' 
testimony with regard to Ms. Snipes' attempts to determine Mr. Reigenborn's presence or 
absence from the 2196 East Lambourne address on the morning of September 2,1998. 
Moreover, Ms. Snipes' mother could have offered testimony with respect to Mr. Reigenborn's 
mental state and mental health prior to the assault. 
The testimony of Ms. Snipes' mother could have undermined Ms. Snipes' credibility and 
could have demonstrated a pattern of harassment and provocation by Ms. Snipes of Mr. 
Reigenborn. Evidence of such harassment and provocation would have bolstered attempts by 
defense counsel to demonstrate that Mr. Reigenborn suffered diminished mental capacity and 
lacked the requisite intent to commit the offense of assault. Certainly this testimony is material 
and its presence may have affected the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, Mr. Reigenborn was 
denied his constitutional right to compulsory process and is therefore entitled to a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant William Keith Reigenborn respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this^/ day of June, 2000. 
SHANNON N. ROMERO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawfiil force or violeo.ce, th at ::a:t ises 01 
creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the person causes substantial bodily 
iiyury to another. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily 
injury to another. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Powei to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1 • [Citizenship - Due process of lav Equal 
protection,] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
